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1 Introduction 
For about the last two decades, the consensus has been that economic growth is 
necessary but not, by itself, sufficient for the alleviation of poverty. Additional elements 
are required. First, poor households need to build up their asset base in order to 
participate in the growth process. Second, growth needs to be broad-based to reach all 
segments of society, including the poor. Third, short-term public assistance measures 
are required to protect vulnerable groups of society, because it takes time for the needy 
to benefit from the impact of a policy or strategy.  
 
Implementing this agenda to reduce poverty requires methods or tools that can 
effectively reach poor households or individuals. This may be accomplished by public 
spending on items like universal education, which can reach wide sections of society, 
including the poor. Alternatively, it can be achieved through a direct transfer of 
resources to the poor. However, in practice, problems commonly arise because of 
scarcity of resources. With fixed budgets, governments are often forced to direct 
resources to specific groups of households or individuals. Targeting specific groups will 
achieve the maximum impact from a given budget or minimize the costs of achieving a 
given impact. This attraction is particularly strong for transfer programmes that 
constitute safety nets, because such transfers provide a benefit that is largely a private 
good for recipient households.   
 
While targeting has its own merits, there are a number of methods that can provide 
resources to a particular group. The existing literature largely focuses on individual 
programmes, with comparative analyses tending to cover a single region or method of 
intervention (Grosh 1994; Braithwaite et al. 2000; Bigman and Fofack 2000; Rawlings 
et al. 2001). A partial approach of this kind is not helpful for making broader 
assessments about the effectiveness of different targeting methods. This chapter 
attempts to provide a general framework for evaluating the targeting efficiency of 
government welfare programmes and to draw lessons from developing country 
experiences that are relevant for policy making. 
 
A government programme may be defined as pro-poor if it provides greater absolute 
benefits to the poor compared to the non-poor. Suppose there are two programmes, A 
and B, incurring the same cost. Then A will be more pro-poor than B if it leads to greater 
poverty reduction than B. Utilizing this definition, Kakwani and Son (2005) developed a 
new index called the ‘Pro-Poor Policy’ (PPP) index, which measures the pro-poorness 
of government programmes as well as of basic service delivery in education, health and 
infrastructure.  
 
The PPP index is derived as the ratio of actual poverty reduction from a government 
programme to the poverty reduction that would have been achieved if every individual   2
in society received exactly the same benefits from the programme. The PPP index 
provides a means of assessing the targeting efficiency of government programmes. 
Furthermore, Kakwani and Son (2005) developed two subtypes of PPP indices by 
socioeconomic groups, namely ‘within-group’ and ‘total-group’ PPP indices. While the 
within-group PPP index measures the pro-poorness of a programme within a group, the 
total-group PPP index captures the impact of operating a programme in a group on its 
pro-poorness at the national level. The argument is based on the premise that the 
targeting efficiency of a particular group should be judged on the basis of a total-group 
PPP index.1 Using micro data from household surveys, the proposed methodology is 
applied to Thailand, the Russian Federation, Vietnam and 15 African countries. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents a brief non-technical 
description of the methodology proposed by Kakwani and Son (2005). It outlines the 
poverty measures used in the chapter; the definition of the PPP index; the values of the 
PPP index attainable under perfect targeting; and the PPP index by socioeconomic 
groups. More technical details are reported in Kakwani and Son (2005). The following 
section presents empirical results for Thailand, Russia, and Vietnam. The penultimate 
section provides empirical results for 15 African countries, and the final section 
summarizes the major findings.  
2 Methodology 
2.1  Poverty measure  
We measure the pro-poorness of a government policy by measuring its impact on 
poverty. Policy A is more pro-poor than policy B if it achieves a greater reduction in 
aggregate poverty for a given cost. Aggregate poverty can be measured in a variety of 
ways. In this chapter, we focus on the Foster et al. (1984) class of additively separable 
poverty measures. These include the headcount ratio (the percentage of people living 
below a poverty threshold); the poverty gap ratio, capturing the depth of poverty; and 
the severity of poverty index. The evaluation of a poverty reduction policy depends on 
the choice of poverty measure. For instance, addressing the headcount ratio will require 
policies different than those for addressing the poverty gap or the severity of poverty 
index. The headcount ratio is a crude measure of poverty because it completely ignores 
the gaps in incomes from the poverty line and the distribution of income among the 
poor. The severity of poverty index has all the desirable properties. 
                                                 
 
1 It is possible that a programme may be well-targeted within group but may not be considered well-
targeted at the national level because of disparity in incomes between groups.    3
2.2  Pro-poor policy index  
Suppose that a welfare transfer from the government leads to an increase in recipients’ 
income or consumption. Then there will be a reduction in poverty due to the increase in 
income. We define a government programme to be pro-poor if the poor receive greater 
absolute benefits than the non-poor. This means that a pro-poor government programme 
should achieve greater poverty reduction than a programme in which everyone receives 
exactly the same benefit. The PPP index is defined as the ratio of the actual poverty 
reduction from the programme to the poverty reduction that would have been achieved 
if every individual in the society received the average benefit from the programme. A 
programme is called pro-poor (or anti-poor) when the PPP index is greater (or less) than 
unity. The larger the value of the PPP index, the greater is the degree of pro-poorness of 
the programme.  
 
To calculate the PPP index, a programme does not have to involve cash transfers. In 
fact, a large number of government programmes involve education, health and other 
social benefits which do not provide cash to individuals, but nevertheless contribute to 
their standard of living. Hence, it can be assumed that if a person uses a government 
service then they receive some notional cash. If all individuals who utilize a government 
service are assumed to receive the same notional cash benefits then we can calculate the 
PPP index. 
2.3  Perfect targeting  
The PPP index achieves its lowest value of zero if the government programme does not 
reduce any poverty at all, which will happen when all benefits go to the non-poor. This 
is considered to be the extreme situation of imperfect targeting. Conversely, perfect 
targeting may be defined as a situation where only the poor benefit, and all the benefits 
are proportional to the income shortfall from the poverty line. Kakwani and Son (2005) 
define two different values of the PPP index obtainable under perfect targeting, 
depending upon how the poverty line is defined. In one scenario every household has a 
different poverty line depending on household composition and the prices faced by that 
household. In our empirical study of Thailand, the official poverty line varies with 
households, whereas for Vietnam the poverty line is fixed for all households. In each 
case, the value of the PPP index under perfect targeting is defined differently.  
 
In practice, it is not possible to achieve perfect targeting because it is difficult to obtain 
accurate information on household income or consumption. We generally resort to 
proxy targeting by geographical region or other socioeconomic characteristic of 
households. In this study, the targeting efficiency of a programme is judged on the basis 
of the value of the PPP index. The value of the PPP index under perfect targeting may 
be used as a benchmark to assess the targeting performance of government programmes. 
This methodology can also be used for ex-ante formulation of new government 
programmes.   4
2.4  PPP index by socioeconomic groups 
Taking the analysis a step further, a decomposition methodology is proposed to explain 
the PPP index in terms of two factors: the within-group PPP index, and the total-group 
PPP index. Suppose there are k mutually exclusive socioeconomic groups. The within-
group PPP index measures the degree of pro-poorness of a programme within the kth 
group. It does not tell us whether targeting the kth group will necessarily lead to a pro-
poor outcome at the national level. Since our objective is to achieve the maximum 
reduction of poverty at the national level, we need to see the impact of targeting the kth 
group on national poverty. To capture this effect, another PPP index for the kth group is 
proposed, called the total-group PPP index.  
 
The total-group PPP index shows that the pro-poor policy index for the whole country is 
the weighted average of the pro-poor policy indices for individual groups, with weights 
proportional to the share of benefits received by each group. To reduce poverty at 
national level, applying the government programme to some groups will be more 
efficient than to others. This efficiency can be captured by the value of the total-group 
PPP index; the larger the value of the total-group PPP index the more efficient is that 
group in reducing national poverty. On the whole, the methodology presented can help 
us to identify the efficient groups from the viewpoint of improving targeting efficiency.  
3  Case studies I: Thailand, Russia and Vietnam 
In this section, we apply our methodology to Thailand, Russia and Vietnam. The PPP 
index is applied to Thailand and Russia to capture the extent to which the welfare 
schemes of those governments benefit the poor. For Vietnam the PPP index reflects the 
degree to which basic services, including education and health, are used effectively by 
its population.  
 
For all three countries, the data is taken from household surveys, and the analysis is 
based on per capita consumption. The surveys are nationwide and cover the periods 
2000, 2002 and 1997-98 for Thailand, Russia and Vietnam, respectively. The poverty 
lines are country-specific. A single average national poverty line is used for Vietnam, 
but the Thai and Russian poverty lines differ across households because they take into 
account the different needs of household members by gender and age, as well as spatial 
variations in the cost of living.2 
                                                 
 
2 For a detailed discussion of Thailand and Russian poverty lines, see Kakwani (2003, 2004).   5
3.1  Welfare programmes in Thailand and Russia 
Thailand 
In recent years, the Thai government has implemented a few social welfare 
programmes, including social pensions for the elderly, low-income medical cards, 
health insurance cards, and free school lunch programmes. These are means-tested and 
have been designed to target low-income groups. In this section, we use the PPP index 
to examine whether these welfare programmes have benefited poor people.  
 
Table 1 presents the PPP index for Thailand’s social welfare programmes.3 As can be 
seen from the table, all four welfare programmes have a PPP index value greater than 1. 
Hence, we may conclude that all four welfare programmes benefit the poor more than 
the non-poor. Overall, the poor have greater access to these government welfare 
programmes than the non-poor. Interestingly, the welfare programmes for low-income 
medical cards and free school lunches have higher PPP index values with respect to the 
severity of poverty measure. Since the severity of poverty measure gives greater weight 
to the ultra-poor, this indicates that the absolute benefits of low-income medical cards 
and free school lunches flow to the ultra-poor more than to the moderately poor. 
 
We also calculated the PPP index for a hypothetical universal pension system. Suppose 
that every elderly person over 65 years of age receives a pension from the government. 
Is this scenario more pro-poor than the actual pension system? The PPP index indicates 
that although a universal pension scheme for the elderly is pro-poor—and is even more 
beneficial to the ultra-poor—the present pension system is far more pro-poor than the 
universal one. This implies that the current means-tested pension system yields more 
benefits to the poor than a universal pension system for those aged 65 years or more.4 
 
Table 1: Pro-poor policy index for welfare programmes in Thailand, 2000 
Welfare schemes  Poverty gap ratio  Severity of poverty
Social pension for the elderly  1.68  1.54 
Low-income medical cards  2.02  2.12 
Health insurance cards  1.29  1.25 
Free school lunches  2.02  2.06 
Perfect targeting  6.77  10.31 
Universal social pensions (for elderly over 65 years of age) 1.21  1.24 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Thailand’s Household Socioeconomic Survey 2000 (National Statistics 
Office 2000). 
                                                 
 
3 The PPP index was not calculated here for the headcount ratio because it required estimating the density 
function at the poverty line which could not be done without making parametric assumptions. Moreover, 
the headcount ratio is a crude measure of poverty. Our focus is on the poverty gap ratio and the severity 
of poverty index, which are more satisfactory measures. 
4 This analysis, takes no account of the administrative costs involved in providing mean-tested pensions.   6
Perfect targeting is the ideal policy for poverty reduction. In practice, it is not feasible to 
operate such a policy because: (i) the administrative cost is very high, and (ii) it is 
difficult to obtain accurate information on individuals’ income or consumption, 
particularly in countries with large informal sectors. If the government in Thailand had 
succeeded in implementing perfect targeting, the PPP index would have been 6.8 for the 
poverty gap and 10.3 for the severity of poverty measure. Thus, although pro-poor, the 
Thai welfare programmes have much lower values than the values that would have been 
obtained with perfect targeting. This suggests that there is scope for improving the 
targeting efficiency of the Thai welfare programmes. 
 
In the previous section, we mentioned two types of PPP indices by groups: the within-
group PPP index and the total-group PPP index. As stated, the former measures the pro-
poorness of a programme within the kth group, whereas the latter captures the impact of 
operating a programme in the kth group on its pro-poorness at the national level. The 
results for Thailand are presented in Table 2. The total-group PPP index reveals that the 
welfare programmes are more pro-poor in the rural areas than in the urban areas. In fact 
healthcare cards and free school lunches are not pro-poor in the urban areas, indicating 
that the government expenditures on these programmes in the urban areas did not 
benefit the poor more than the non-poor. It is, however, interesting to note that the 
within-group PPP index shows that all programmes are more pro-poor in the urban 
areas than in the rural areas. Thus, the total-group and within-group indices present 
opposite results. The main reason for this is that welfare programmes in Thailand are 
better targeted within the urban areas than within the rural areas. Since the concentration 
of poor is higher in the rural areas, the impact of targeting the rural areas turns out to be 
more pro-poor at the national level. Thus, the two indices provide us with two different 
types of information about targeting. If our objective is to reduce poverty at the national 
level, then the efficiency of targeting a particular group should be judged on the basis of 
the total-group PPP index. 
Table 2: Pro-poor policy index by urban and rural areas in Thailand, 2000 
   Total-group PPP index  Within-group PPP index 
Welfare schemes  urban  rural  urban  rural 
   Poverty gap ratio 
Social pension for the elderly  1.13  1.76  4.41  1.31 
Low-income medical cards  1.44  2.10  5.60  1.56 
Health insurance cards  0.70  1.39  2.72  1.03 
Free school lunches  0.81  2.21  3.15  1.64 
   Severity of poverty 
Social pension for the elderly  1.18  1.60  5.42  1.17 
Low-income medical cards  1.34  2.23  6.18  1.63 
Health insurance cards  0.61  1.36  2.83  0.99 
Free school lunches  0.73  2.27  3.37  1.66 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Thailand’s Household Socioeconomic Survey 2000 (National Statistics 
Office 2000). 
   7
Russia 
Russia has a well-developed social benefits system, of which old-age pension is the 
largest component. Table 3 shows that out of the total population of 143.3 million, 53.6 
million (37.4 per cent) are receiving some kind of government benefit.5 Thus, the 
Russian social benefits system is very large in terms of population coverage. The old-
age pension is the largest welfare programme, with 26.32 million recipients. The second 
largest programme is child allowance, benefiting 17.42 million children. The disability 
pension is given to 3.19 million people.  










Old-age pension  26.32  49.08  38.74  82.79 
Disability pension  3.19  5.96  3.61  7.71 
Loss of breadwinner pension  1.64  3.05  1.27  2.72 
Social pension  0.27  0.5  0.26  0.56 
Care for children under 18  0.84  1.57  0.41  0.88 
Child allowance  17.42  32.49  1.45  3.09 
Unemployment benefit  0.45  0.84  0.31  0.65 
Other benefits  0.95  1.77  0.2  0.42 
Scholarship 2.55  4.76  0.55  1.17 
All benefits  53.6  100  46.89  100 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Russian Family Budget Survey 2002. 
 
The Russian government spends 46.8 billion rubles per month on welfare programmes 
(excluding administrative costs), of which 38.74 billion rubles pay for pensions. 
Expenditure on child allowances is only 1.45 billion rubles, which equates to only 83.1 
rubles per month per child. As the incidence of poverty among children is very severe, 
the child allowance is too small to have a significant impact on poverty among children. 
Overall, the average benefit level is equal to 326.5 rubles per person per month. The 
average lower poverty line for Russia is 1055.9 rubles per person per month, so the 
government pays average benefits equal to one third of the poverty line.6 
 
To what extent do government benefits go to the poor compared to the non-poor in 
Russia? The PPP index values in Table 4 provide empirical estimates of the pro-
poorness of each of the government welfare programmes that are currently implemented 
in Russia. As can be seen from the table, all benefits taken together have PPP values far 
greater than 1. Thus, we may conclude that the welfare system in Russia tends to benefit 
the poor more than the non-poor. More importantly, the absolute benefits of the welfare 
 
                                                 
 
5 Some persons receive more than one benefit at the same time: the number is small and has been 
neglected here. 
6 The poverty line in Russia is not constant across households, so we calculated the average poverty line 
across individuals in all households.   8
Table 4: PPP indices for Russian welfare system in 2002 
Types of government benefits   Poverty gap ratio  Severity of poverty 
Old-age pension  2.20  4.13 
Disability pension  2.18  4.16 
Loss-of-breadwinner pension  2.09  2.40 
Social pension  2.22  2.80 
Care for children under 18 months  1.78  1.87 
Child (under 16 years) allowance  1.19  0.79 
Unemployment benefits  2.22  3.80 
Other benefits  1.74  2.75 
Scholarship 0.90  0.62 
All benefits  2.14  3.90 
Perfect targeting  3.02  5.71 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Russian Family Budget Survey 2002. 
 
system do indeed flow more to the ultra-poor than to the poor, as suggested by the 
higher value of PPP index (equal to 3.90) for the severity of poverty measure.7 Table 4 
also reveals that if the Russian government had implemented perfect targeting, the PPP 
index would have been 3.02 and 5.71 for the poverty gap ratio and the severity of 
poverty index, respectively. This suggests that although Russian welfare programmes 
are not perfectly targeted to the poor, the deviation from perfect targeting is not large.  
 
Results for the severity of poverty index indicate that child allowances, (given to those 
aged below 16 years) and scholarships are not particularly pro-poor. This is evident 
from the fact that the PPP indices of these two programmes fall far below unity for the 
severity of poverty measure, suggesting that the absolute benefits of these programmes 
do not flow to the ultra-poor. It further suggests that these programmes may require 
better targeting than the current system in order to favour those far below the poverty 
threshold. 
3.2  Health services in Vietnam 
Over the past decade or so, Vietnam has enjoyed a significant improvement in its 
standard of living as a result of its impressive performance in growth and poverty 
reduction. More importantly, growth has been pro-poor, benefiting the poor 
proportionally more than the non-poor (Kakwani and Son 2004). In this context, it is 
interesting to examine whether, along with a rising standard of living and pro-poor 
growth, poor people benefit from the provision of health services in Vietnam.  
 
Table 5 presents the PPP index for utilization of various health facilities in Vietnam. 
The results show that only community health centres have a PPP index value greater 
                                                 
 
7 Note that the PPP index for all benefits is the weighted average of the PPP indices for all 9 welfare 
programmes, with the weight proportional to the share of benefits accruing to people of each programme 
presented in the third column of Table 3.   9
than 1. This suggests that the poor have greater access to community health centres than 
the non-poor and that community health centres play an important role in providing 
basic health services to the poor in Vietnam. Unfortunately, community health centres 
do not provide quality health services because they are generally poorly staffed and 
equipped. So the poor do not receive quality healthcare treatment.  
 
Public hospitals in Vietnam provide higher quality care and are mainly used by 
individuals with health insurance. Utilization of government hospitals has a PPP index 
value far less than 1, implying that public hospitals provide greater benefits to the non-
poor than to the poor. Thus, the poor have less access to the quality health services 
provided by public hospitals. 
 
It is not surprising that the provision of health insurance is not pro-poor because those 
covered by health insurance have access to government hospitals. Moreover, coverage 
under the health insurance programme is more extensive for better off individuals. 
Having health insurance is positively correlated with the individuals’ income; while the 
coverage rate is 9.2 per cent in the bottom income quartile, 24.5 per cent have health 
insurance in the top income quartile. 
 
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that pharmacy utilization is almost pro-poor 
(0.96 for the poverty gap ratio). It is reasonable to assume that more highly educated 
individuals—and hence presumably those more aware of the risks of self-medication—
avoid pharmacy visits. Pharmacy utilization therefore appears to be an inferior good for 
the high-income group since rich individuals go to public hospitals for their healthcare. 
On the other hand, pharmacy visits are a normal good for poor households.  
 
 
Table 5: Pro-poor policy index for health services in Vietnam, 1997-98 (poverty gap 
ratio) 
     Total-Group PPP index  Within-Group PPP index
Health facilities  Vietnam  urban  rural  urban  rural 
   Poverty gap ratio 
Government hospitals  0.62  0.07  0.91  0.34  0.74 
Commune health centres  1.17  0.27  1.23  1.38  1.00 
Regional polyclinics  0.84  0.42  0.98  2.14  0.79 
Eastern medicine facilities  0.96  0.04  1.15  0.21  0.94 
Pharmacies 0.96  0.26  1.16  1.29  0.94 
Private doctors  0.79  0.12  0.98  0.59  0.80 
Health insurance  0.50  0.08  0.79  0.40  0.64 
            
Perfect targeting  2.86         
Source: authors’ calculation based on Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1997-98. 
Note: The PPP index for the severity of poverty index was calculated but not presented in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, the results are similar to those for the poverty gap ratio. 
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The total-group PPP index values in Table 5 also reveal that three health facilities—
community health centres, pharmacies, and Eastern medicine facilities—are more pro-
poor in rural areas than in urban areas. This suggests that government subsidies on these 
health services in the rural areas do benefit poor people more than the non-poor. In 
addition, the within-group PPP index indicates that, within the urban sector, sick and 
injured individuals from poor households receive far less benefits from healthcare 
facilities such as government hospitals and Eastern medicine facilities. By comparison, 
in rural areas the poor benefit more from community health centres, Eastern medicine 
facilities and pharmacies.  
3.3  Educational services in Vietnam 
In this subsection, we apply our PPP index methodology to assess educational services 
in Vietnam. Our prime objective is to discover the extent to which public education at 
primary and secondary levels is pro-poor. We also attempt to find out whether free 
universal education will benefit the poor more than the non-poor.  
 
Table 6 reveals that public primary education benefits the poor more than the non-poor, 
and is even more pro-poor for the ultra-poor. This conclusion is consistent with the fact 
that net primary school enrolment increased from 87 to 91 per cent over the period 
1993-98 (Nguyen 2002). Changes in the allocation of public spending on education in 
the 1990s could have further favoured lower levels of education. The share of public 
spending on education going to the poor increased from 16.5 per cent in 1993 to 18.1 
per cent in 1998 (ibid.). Although public primary schools are pro-poor, other types of 
schools at the same level are very anti-poor. In other words, primary schools that are 
semi-public or sponsored by the private sector benefit better off children more than poor 
ones. This suggests that educational subsidies given to these types of schools are likely 
to benefit the non-poor more than the poor. Table 6 also shows that lower secondary 
education in Vietnam is not pro-poor, as indicated by the PPP index. This finding 
emerges consistently, irrespective of school type. At the lower secondary level, net 
enrolment rates more than doubled between 1993 and 1998, from 30 per cent to 62 per 
cent. However, for the population as a whole, 38 per cent of children aged 11-14 years 
old were not enrolled in lower secondary school, while 66 per cent of the poorest 
children in this age range were not enrolled in primary school. The disparity in 
enrolment rates between the richest and poorest quintiles has been highly significant 
over the years.  
 
As expected, the PPP index shows that upper secondary schools in Vietnam have far 
more children from better off households than from poor households. This is true for all 
types of schools at this level. No children from poor households were enrolled in the 
upper secondary level schools sponsored by the private sector. Over the period 1993-98, 
children from the poorest quintile experienced an increase in enrolment in upper 
secondary schools from 1 to 5 per cent, as compared to an increase from 21 to 64 per 
cent for the richest quintile (Nguyen 2002).   11
Table 6: Pro-poor policy index for education service in Vietnam, 1997-98 
School types  Primary  Lower Secondary Upper  Secondary 
   Poverty gap ratio 
Public 1.29  0.79  0.37 
Semi-public 0.55  0.15  0.23 
Sponsored 0.63  0.51  0.00 
   Severity of poverty 
Public 1.31  0.65  0.23 
Semi-public 0.19  0.08  0.09 
Sponsored 0.14  0.26  0.00 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1997-98. 
Note: The figures in the table do not separate the benefits of public and private expenditures going to 
individuals. However, they tell us which services additional public subsidies should go. 
Table 7: Pro-poor policy index if universal education is provided in Vietnam 
   Poverty gap ratio  Severity of poverty 
Primary 1.28  1.33 
Lower secondary  1.08  1.06 
Upper secondary  0.91  0.85 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1997-98.  
 
We now use the PPP index to compare universal education with the current system. 
Table 7 shows that universal education at primary and lower secondary levels in 
Vietnam would provide more benefits to poor children than to the non-poor. The degree 
of pro-poorness of universal access to primary education among children aged 6 to 10 
years old is almost as high as actually achieved by the current education system. 
Similarly, if lower secondary education is made universal for children aged between 11 
and 14 years, the outcome is pro-poor. This contrasts with the actual current situation. 
The PPP index is 0.79 for lower secondary education, compared to 1.08 if lower 
secondary education were universal. At higher levels, universal provision is not likely to 
deliver pro-poor outcomes, as indicated by a PPP index for upper secondary schooling 
of less than unity. Although, universal education at higher levels would not be pro-poor, 
it would encourage poor individuals aged between 15 and 17 to enrol for upper 
secondary schooling and hence obtain greater access to higher education compared to 
the current situation in Vietnam. 
3.4  Basic infrastructure services in Vietnam 
Infrastructure services make significant contributions to people’s wellbeing. Basic 
services, such as piped water and sanitation (for example, sewerage systems and 
flushing toilets), have a direct impact on health status and overall wellbeing. Access to 
other services, such as electricity and telephones, helps households increase their 
prospects for income generation. A number of studies reveal that household access to 
basic services has a high and negative correlation with poverty. 
 
As shown in Table 8, the benefits generated from all types of basic services accrue to 
the non-poor more than to the poor in Vietnam. Poor households in general have much   12
greater access to piped water and electricity than sanitary systems; the PPP index for 
water and electricity are 0.86 and 0.80, respectively, when measured by the poverty gap 
ratio, compared to only 0.10 for sanitary facilities. As suggested in Table 8, the benefits 
from sanitary services (waste collection and flushing toilets in this case) are highly 
skewed in favour of the non-poor. The benefits of all types of basic services are lower 
for the severity of poverty measure, suggesting that the ultra-poor have even less access 
to infrastructure services than the poor. 
Table 8: Pro-poor policy index for basic infrastructure service in Vietnam, 1997-98 
Access to basic infrastructure services  Poverty gap ratio  Severity of poverty 
      
Electricity 0.80  0.71 
Piped and tap water  0.86  0.81 
Collected waste  0.10  0.07 
Sanitary toilets  0.10  0.05 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1997-98. 
4  Case studies II: 15 African countries 
This section makes use of household micro datasets from 15 African countries obtained 
from the African Household Survey Data Bank of the World Bank. The countries and 
years of the survey are: Burundi 1998, Burkina Faso 1998, Ivory Coast 1998, Cameroon 
1996, Ethiopia 2000, Ghana 1998, Guinea 1994, Gambia 1998, Kenya 1997, 
Madagascar 2001, Mozambique 1996, Malawi 1997, Nigeria 1996, Uganda 1999, and 
Zambia in 1998. National poverty lines for the 15 countries are obtained from various 
poverty assessment reports. These poverty lines were originally very crude and did not 
take account of the different needs of household members by age and gender. Moreover, 
the poverty lines were not adjusted for the economies of scale which exist in large 
households. To overcome these shortcomings, Kakwani and Subbarao (2005) made 
some modifications to the national poverty lines, taking into account the different needs 
of household members and economies of scale.  
4.1  Targeting children: targeting versus universal 
According to Coady et al. (2002), more than a quarter of targeted programmes in all 
developing countries had regressive benefit incidence. For instance, they found that the 
poorest 40 per cent received less than 40 per cent of poverty alleviation budget 
expenditures. Such ineffective targeting of poor households suggests that the overall 
impact of such spending on poverty has been smaller than it could have been. Moreover, 
the administrative cost of implementing any targeted programme is very high. Much of 
the budget is spent on simply getting the resources to poor families. Consequently, the 
cost per unit of income transferred can be substantial. Transfer programmes are 
administratively complex as they require resources to undertake targeting of transfers and 
to monitor the recipients’ actions. In this context, one might argue for a scenario of 
universal transfers.   13
In this section, we estimate the PPP indices under a universal transfer programme for 
children aged between 5 and 16 years old. Under such a programme, every child in this 
age group is assumed to receive a fixed transfer irrespective poverty status. The results 
are presented in Figures 21.1 and 21.2 and Table 9. From Figures 21.1 and 21.2, we 
 
Figure 1: Pro-poor policy indices under universal transfers and perfect targeting 
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note that the PPP index values with perfect targeting are quite small for the 15 African 
countries compared to the PPP index values in Thailand, Russia, and Vietnam. In fact, 
the PPP indices with perfect targeting differ little from the indices associated with 
universal transfers. This suggests that perfect targeting may not be needed in cases such 
as these 15 African countries, where poverty is extremely high. 
 
Table 9 carries two important messages. First, the results indicate that universal 
transfers will provide more absolute benefits to children from poor families than those 
from non-poor families. Second, a universal transfer scheme is likely to bring about an 
even more pro-poor outcome if implemented in rural areas where most poor children 
live. One exception is in the case of Nigeria where, in contrast, poverty is widespread in 
both urban and rural areas.  
 
One possible criticism is that we do not have an actual scenario which allows targeted 
transfers to be compared with universal transfers. Nevertheless, the main implication 
emerging from the PPP index is that if a transfer is given to every child aged between 5-
16 years old, it is likely to provide more absolute benefits to poor children, particularly 
in rural areas. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that universal targeting of children 
may not be a bad policy option, particularly in rural areas. It may be more cost effective, 
as targeting only a small subgroup of children requires a high level of administrative 
costs to be devoted to identifying the poor. 
 
Table 9: Pro-poor policy index for universal transfers to rural and urban areas 
Country   Poverty gap ratio  Severity of poverty 
   Universal targeting  Universal targeting 
   rural  urban  total 
Perfect 
targeting




Burundi    1.12 0.28  1.09  1.59  1.16 0.23 1.12  2.11 
Burkina  Faso  1.18 0.43  1.07  1.81  1.21 0.38 1.08  2.53 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1.51 0.60  1.10  2.51  1.63 0.45 1.09  3.63 
Cameroon  1.28 0.60  1.09  1.54  1.32 0.50 1.08  2.05 
Ethiopia  1.13 0.73  1.07  2.37  1.14 0.74 1.09  3.42 
Ghana  1.39 0.54  1.09  2.24  1.47 0.42 1.10  3.03 
Guinea  1.42 0.37  1.08  2.56  1.47 0.31 1.10  3.40 
Gambia    1.37 0.65  1.08  1.56  1.56 0.39 1.08  2.00 
Kenya    1.25 0.29  1.14  1.95  1.27 0.18 1.16  2.53 
Madagascar    1.22 0.65  1.09  1.57  1.29 0.57 1.13  1.95 
Mozambique    1.19 0.62  1.07  1.42  1.24 0.59 1.11  1.77 
Malawi    1.17 0.18  1.07  1.52  1.21 0.09 1.09  1.93 
Nigeria    1.14 1.13  1.14  1.54  1.12 1.21 1.16  1.91 
Uganda    1.17 0.25  1.06  2.00  1.20 0.19 1.08  2.75 
Zambia    1.23 0.76  1.05  1.45  1.34 0.57 1.06  1.80 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on 15 African household surveys. 
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5 Conclusions 
Kakawni and Son (2005) proposed a new index called the pro-poor policy (PPP) index. 
This index measures the pro-poorness of government welfare programmes and basic 
service delivery in education, health and infrastructure. It is an attempt to introduce a 
methodology for assessing the techniques of targeting in order to make them more 
effective. 
 
The conclusion reached was that the targeting efficiency of a particular group should be 
judged on the basis of the total-group PPP index. If our objective is to reduce poverty, 
then social transfer programmes should be designed so that they lead to the maximum 
reduction in poverty under given resource constraints. To achieve this objective, perfect 
targeting is the ideal solution. Two prerequisites are necessary: the poor get all the 
benefits; and the benefits given to the poor are proportional to their income shortfalls 
from the poverty line. To implement such a programme, we must have detailed 
information of people’s income or consumption expenditure. Such detailed information 
and the administrative ability to use it are, of course, not present in most developing 
countries. Therefore, policymakers have to resort to a form of proxy targeting in which 
transfers are based on easily identifiable household characteristics. However, proxy 
targeting can never achieve complete targeting success. This study attempts to assess 
the targeting efficiency of government programmes by discovering how good is proxy 
targeting compared to perfect targeting. Government programmes may be defined as 
pro-poor if they provide greater benefits to the poor than to the non-poor.  
 
Using micro household data, the methodology was applied to Thailand, Russia, Vietnam 
and 15 African countries. The major conclusions emerging from our empirical analysis 
can be synthesized as follows. First, all four welfare programmes implemented recently 
by the Thai government were found to be pro-poor. In particular, welfare programmes 
designed to help the very poor—including low-income medical cards and free school 
lunches—were shown to be highly pro-poor, benefiting the ultra-poor more than the 
poor. In addition, a universal pension for those over 65 years of age was found to be less 
pro-poor than the present old-age pension system. This suggests that the Thai 
government should continue with its present old-age pension scheme.  
 
Second, the study found that the welfare system in Russia tends to benefit the poor more 
than the non-poor. Moreover, the absolute benefits of the welfare system flow more to 
the ultra-poor than to the poor, as suggested by the PPP index value for the severity of 
poverty index, which is higher than that for the poverty gap ratio. The study found the 
Russian welfare programmes to be reasonably well-targeted, as is evident from the fact 
that the PPP indices of welfare programmes are quite close to (but still lower than) the 
index value expected with perfect targeting. The study also found that the child 
allowance and scholarship programmes are not pro-poor for the ultra-poor in particular.   16
This suggests that these programmes may require better targeting than the current 
system in order to favour those living far below the poverty threshold. 
 
Third, basic services—health and education—in Vietnam were found to be mostly anti-
poor. Although government hospitals provide the highest quality of healthcare, the poor 
are much less likely to use them. This is not true for community health centres, which 
appear to provide more services to individuals from poor households. Unfortunately, 
community health centres do not provide quality health services because they are poorly 
staffed and equipped. Thus, on the whole, the poor in Vietnam have less access to 
quality healthcare. Public primary schools were found to be pro-poor—this was due 
partly to the increase in public spending on education for the poor in the 1990s. 
However, secondary education is not pro-poor. This suggests that Vietnam’s universal 
education at primary and lower secondary levels could provide more benefits to students 
from poor households, although this is not true for higher levels of education.    
 
Fourth, simulations of universal transfers to school-age children in 15 African countries 
indicate that universal transfers provide more absolute benefits to children from poor 
families than to those from non-poor families. In addition, a universal transfer scheme 
was found to be likely to have an even more pro-poor outcome if implemented in the 
rural areas, where most poor children reside. This finding is true for all the countries 
except Nigeria, where poverty is widespread in both urban and rural areas. 
 
Finally, the study found that in the 15 African countries, the value of PPP index with 
perfect targeting was quite small compared to the index values for Thailand, Russia and 
Vietnam. The index value of perfect targeting for Thailand was far greater than for 
Russia and Vietnam. For the African countries the PPP indices under perfect targeting 
differed little from the indices corresponding to universal provision. Therefore, we 
conclude that perfect targeting is not necessary for cases such as these 15 African 
countries where poverty is extremely high. 
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